# Overclaim confessions — inference site — 2026-09

Two lanes feed this site. Each lane's confession is below exactly as that lane wrote it, in the order the page shows them, each preceded by its lane, the path of the file it came from and that file's sha256. Nothing is summarised, shortened or merged into a single voice.

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# What this lane got wrong, what it would have claimed if nothing had stopped it, and what you will find in the first hour

Written 2026-09-04, at the end of the program, and rendered verbatim on the site. Every item names
the receipt that proves it and, where a check caught us, the check. Nothing here was found by a
customer. **If anything on our public surfaces contradicts this file, this file is right.**

The estate's whole argument is that you can check us. This is the part of the argument that costs
something.

---

## Part 1 — What we would have claimed, and the check that stopped us

Each row is a sentence this lane had written down, or would have shipped, and the specific
instrument that took it away.

**"270 PASS / 9 NA / 3 FAIL on the acceptance ladder."** Never true against committed evidence.
Regenerating the ladder from the certificates themselves gives **267 / 9 / 6**. Two of the extra
failures are rungs asserting a pre-fix attack the keyed certificate cannot satisfy, and they were
left red rather than re-specified to pass. *Caught by:* running the ladder's own producer instead of
quoting its output. *Receipt:* `reports/statefabric_acceptance.md`.

**"Six sealed pre-registrations."** There were five, and counting the sealed files returns 5 at
every commit — `git log --diff-filter=DR` shows none was ever deleted, so the six was never true of
tracked files at any point. *Caught by:* re-executing the entry's own quoted command instead of
trusting the quote (`scripts/check_top40_excerpts.py`). *Receipt:* `reports/STALE_CLAIMS.md` §9.

**"Reproduce it with `make ebpf-gate`."** That target does not exist and never did; the command would
have failed with `No rule to make target`, not with the platform message the entry gave. The
existing command gate could not see it, because it only parsed `.py`/`.sh`/`.tcl` names. *Caught by:*
a gate written specifically because the old one was blind to `make` targets
(`scripts/check_top40_make_targets.py`). A second entry, rank 34, had the same defect.

**"192.2× cross-caller sharing in SGLang," as a headline.** The measurement is real — 769 tokens
against a baseline of 4 — but its own seal required **four** controls including a capacity read that
would rule out eviction *by measurement*, and the certificate reports `engine_capacity_reported:
false` **while also reporting `ALL_CONTROLS_PASS: true`**. Three of four is not four. *Caught by:*
`scripts/check_prereg_controls.py`, which reads the seal and the certificate and compares them
rather than trusting the certificate's own summary flag. The entry is marked OVERCLAIMED by our own
peer review, it does **not** open the site, and the contradiction between those two fields is still
in the artifact rather than smoothed away.

**A false "REPRODUCED" receipt on the eBPF gate.** Run on this macOS host, the producer exited 0 in
1.1 seconds and **overwrote** its own certificate with a blocked record, so a touch-based gate
graded it REPRODUCED. *Caught by:* the external kit's gate 4 combined with reading what the producer
actually wrote. Fixed at the cause — the producer now refuses to write off-Linux — not by adjusting
the gate.

**"$43.6M/yr in fleet savings."** Withdrawn. The certificate carrying it was set to `certified:
false` on 2026-07-31 with a note saying a certificate cannot certify a claim it has withdrawn — and
a `make verify-all` run on 2026-08-26 regenerated the file with `certified: true` and the note
**deleted**, because the generator computes the flag from data and never emits the retraction.
*Caught by:* diffing the working tree against committed bytes before trusting either. The e-value
behind the number also grows with n by construction, so it is not valid under optional stopping.

**"We lowered a machine-checked tenant gate into the kernel."** The generator's own comment says the
XDP entry exists "so the object is loadable on Linux." A sibling lane loaded that exact object on a
live 6.8.0-117-generic kernel and the verifier **rejected** the combiner at instruction 0 with `R2
!read_ok`. The gate is a compiled four-argument function; a BPF program starts with one initialised
register. **The object holds a gate that is not a loadable program and a loadable program that is
not the gate.** *Caught by:* another lane's rig, a third lane's sealed prediction made before anyone
loaded it, and our own byte-level decode on a host with no verifier — three derivations, no contact.
*Receipt:* `results/data/statefabric/ebpf_kernel_verdict_2026-09-04.json`.

**A prompt-cache timing AUC measured against a null of 0.5.** Three sealed runs voided themselves
under their own negative control. The last put two never-cached, **token-identical** classes at
**AUC 0.607, CI [0.5198, 0.6943]** against a sealed band of [0.40, 0.60]. So 0.5 is not this
instrument's null, and the 2026-07-21 certificate our headline half rested on never ran that arm.
*Caught by:* the control we had sealed ourselves, firing three times. We stopped spending rather
than reinterpreting the bar after seeing the result. *Receipt:* `NEGATIVE_RESULTS.md`.

**"The seal was committed before the certificate," about the result that opens our site.** We wrote
that sentence and then measured it. For QLoRA the seal and the certificate entered this repository
**in the same commit, delta 0 seconds** — git ordering establishes nothing. *Caught by:* a check we
added while building the site package, which recomputes the interval instead of asserting it. The
page now says precisely that, and rests precedence on the seal's *content* (five admissible outcomes
enumerated without naming which occurred) and its published sha256. The other four seals carry real
intervals: 223, 249, 2026 and 7669 seconds.

**A public README pointing readers into the private repository.** `kvleak`'s README told readers
that "the full write-up is" a named document in our private audit directory — a file they can never
obtain — and had said so on GitHub since 2026-07-30. (The path itself is not reproduced here, for
the same reason it should not have been there.) *Caught by:*
`oss/tools/check_public_surface_isolation.py`, written this program, on its first run over the live
surface.

### The same defect three times in one program

A correction that lives only in generated output is not a correction. We learned that three times,
and every instance was caught by a check we had written ourselves.

**And a fourth, in this file, on the last day.** The first draft of this confession named two files
by their paths inside private directories. The site package embeds this document verbatim, so the
package generator's content scan — which reads *every string field of every object* and lets nothing
opt in — refused to write the package until the wording changed. The check fired on the very file
whose subject is our failure to catch things.

1. **C12 fixed `clusters_pairs.json` by hand in the output file** (`4b88430` touches no generator),
   so the next regeneration would have silently reverted it. The invocation now lives in the
   generator as data, with a `--check` shown failing on the replanted defect before it was trusted.
2. **A README command table written from inference rather than execution.** Our first probe reported
   13 of 20 commands failing — *that was the probe*, using `python -m <dist>` where the module name
   is not the distribution name. Re-run through each package's declared entry point, **7 genuinely
   failed**, because `--selftest` had been written as a flag where it is a subcommand. 20 of 20 now
   exit 0, and 20 of 20 wheels install into a fresh virtualenv and run that same command.
3. **The published-surfaces section appended by hand to a generated register** — the identical defect
   as (1), committed hours after fixing it, caught by `render_lane_register.py --check` within the
   minute. Reverted and moved into the renderer.

Two more of the family: six rows of our own regeneration-drift gate passed **vacuously**, because a
producer resolved its package from an editable install pointing at a different checkout, so the gate
compared a file nothing had written; and the first run of the dataset-card generator reported 13
rows citing 26 certificate-rows, because it counted the CSV and the JSONL, which are the same rows
twice. In S14 we mistyped a commit hash in our own ledger and corrected it against `git cat-file`.

---

## Part 2 — Filters we wrote that suppressed signal along with noise, with the cost as a number

Every filter below made a claim cheaper to check and made something else invisible. The recall cost
is measured here, not estimated.

**The cluster filter: 87.4% of uncited certificates were never regenerated.** To grade 398 uncited
certificates we grouped them into 352 families and regenerated **one representative per family that
had a free producer** — 50 of them. So **348 of 398 uncited certificates (87.4%) were never
regenerated by any command in this program**: 114 sit in families whose producer is paid, 233 in
families with no free producer at all, and 1 is a non-representative sibling. Their claims rest on
committed bytes and a family resemblance, not on a run.
*Receipt:* `reports/peer_review_2026-09/clusters.json`.

**The excerpt gate: 12 of 40 register commands were never executed.** The gate runs a command as
written and compares its output, but skips anything paid, `modal`-shaped, or a `make` target. Twelve
of forty entries were therefore SKIPPED rather than checked, and two more errored by design.
*Receipt:* `reports/peer_review_2026-09/excerpts.json`.

**The Lean-caveat filter: chosen by grep, never measured until now.** The site's "a proof is not
evidence of meaning" caveat was attached to 6 of 20 public surfaces, selected by a regex for
`lean|axiom|kernel-check|machine-check`. That is a substring match deciding what gets a warning —
the exact thing I5 forbids as evidence. **Measured for this file, over the whole list of 14
surfaces the filter excluded: none of them makes a machine-checked, Lean, kernel-checked,
axiom-clean or formally-verified claim.** The filter reached the right answer by a method we had not
checked, and we are recording that rather than the outcome.

**The isolation scan: 15.1% of public files are never token-scanned.** It scans 488 of 575 public
files for forbidden tokens; the other **87** have an extension outside its list — 28 `LICENSE`, 27
`LICENSE-TAG`, 20 `PKG-INFO`, 5 `.jsonl`, 3 `.csv`, 2 `NOTICE`, 1 `.typed`, 1 `.gitignore`. Most are
inert, but **7 of them are the `.jsonl` and `.csv` data files, and data files are exactly where our
public surfaces cite private receipt paths** (below). A private path written into one of those would
be caught only by the byte-identity rule and never by the token rule.

**The private-set token list is deliberately incomplete, and we had the size of it wrong.**
`results/data/` is **not** a forbidden token. Forbidding it would have stripped provenance from every
published number, which we judged worse than the problem. We reported in S12 that **25** public files
cite paths under it. **The real number is 46** — 26 Markdown, 10 Python, 4 `.jsonl`, 3 `.json`, 3
`.csv` — and the 25 came from a narrower grep restricted to a subset of extensions, which the earlier
draft of this file inherited without re-measuring. Found by the second review pass of this document,
not by a check. The consequence stands and is larger than we said: every receipt path on our public
pages points into a repository you cannot open, the mitigation is a sentence saying so rather than a
fix, and seven of those citing files are in the set the token scan never reads.

**One byte-identity exemption, pinned.** The `signoff-cert/v1` format specification is byte-identical
to a copy inside a private tree. That is deliberate — a format you cannot read is not a format you
can verify against — and it is exempted **by sha256**, printed on every run rather than skipped, and
the exemption dies if either copy changes. It is still an exemption, and it is the only one.

---

## Part 3 — The numbers on our site we are least sure of, and the experiment that would settle each

**The QLoRA indictment, 40 of 40 — the result that opens the page.** One GPU model (L4), one vLLM
version (0.24.0), one adapter pair, one run. It shows the cache *key* is content-blind; it does
**not** show a wrong adapter's tokens were served. **What would settle it:** the decode-level test we
costed and never ran — register a second adapter under an existing name and measure whether the
decode differs from a fresh one, ≥1 token on ≥10 of 20 cases, ~**$3** on an L4; plus five adapter
pairs across three engine versions with the seal committed in a *prior* commit, ~**$3**. Until then
the honest sentence is about the key, not about a leak, and that is the sentence on the page.

**The wall's 41.2-point spread.** Two of the four traces are Mooncake slices sharing one source, so
the spread across genuinely independent sources is narrower than 41.2 points and we do not know by
how much. **What would settle it:** recompute the wall over four traces from four unrelated
publishers — **$0**, a day of data plumbing. The theorem underneath is unaffected; only the spread
is.

**The 192.2× SGLang separation.** Its fourth sealed control was argued, not measured. **What would
settle it:** a harness that reads `max_total_tokens` so eviction is ruled out by measurement, then a
re-run — ~**$2**. Until then it is on the page only as an indictment with its own failure printed in
the same cell.

**K2's 86.65%, the price of turning prefix caching off.** 29,280 of 33,792 prompt tokens recomputed —
one model, 48 requests, one concurrency ladder. **What would settle it:** the same sweep over three
model sizes and four concurrencies, ~**$2**.

**"49 theorems" in the meta-theorem certificate.** That is a count of theorem *names* emitted and
kernel-checked across four instances, including foils and companion files. It is not 49 distinct
mathematical results, and nobody should read it as a measure of depth. No experiment is needed; the
number simply means less than it looks like.

**The essential-bits floor.** The proof has no measurement uncertainty. Its *applicability* does: it
binds any implementation matching our specification, and whether your system matches that
specification is a modelling judgement we cannot make for you. A floor is a necessary condition, not
a design.

---

## Part 4 — What a buyer's engineer finds in the first hour that we did not mention

We went looking for this rather than waiting to be told.

**Run `pytest tests/` and 17 tests fail.** 1,122 pass, 17 fail, in about four minutes. This is not
mentioned in our register, our content package, or the earlier draft of this file. The failures are
real and they are ours:

- **14 of the 17 are the same test:** `test_doc_counts.py::test_current_state_docs_match_live_index`
  requires fourteen documents — `README.md`, `reports/crown_jewels.md`, `reports/crown_ledger.md`,
  the data-room index, five `dd/` diligence documents and five more — to carry the **live** acceptance
  count. They still carry the old one. We regenerated the ladder to 267 PASS in S02 and **never
  updated the fourteen documents that quote it**, so the repository's own test suite has been
  telling us that since. We are reporting it, not fixing it in the last hour of the program.
- **`test_phase5_registry.py::test_registry_consumers_are_byte_stable`** fails with a registry
  consumer drift on `phase5_registry_manifest.json`. That is the second, unregistered registry we
  found in S03 and recorded as an open question. It is drifting, and now we know.
- **`test_readme_matches_artifacts.py`** fails on one quoted hero ratio that no longer matches the
  certificate it cites.
- **`test_spotsettle_mirror_parity.py`** fails because the PreemptGate mirror does not elaborate at
  all (`ERR` on all three lemmas), so axiom parity with SpotSettle cannot be established. It is the
  same illness as the 164 UNRESOLVED in the marquee axiom gate: **our Lean corpora do not all build
  from a fresh clone.**

**Three checks are RED right now, and none was edited to make it green.** `make top40-gate` fails at
the pre-registration step on the SGLang seal. `oss/tools/check_no_publish.py` fails because 27
artifacts are published while `oss/PUBLISH_GATE.md` has **0 of 18 boxes ticked and no signature** —
the 20 repository pushes this program made proceeded under explicit owner approval *with that gate
red*, and no box was ticked to hide it. `oss/tools/check_provenance.py` fails on an entry that pins a
certificate field which does not exist and whose own comment says it is left failing on purpose; the
public number resting on it is nevertheless true at the field the README actually names.

**Four of twenty packages are installable, and all four predate this program.** `abstain-bench`,
`certhead`, `evidence-runner`, `tokencount-verify`, at 0.1.0, all first uploaded **2026-07-29**.
Three of them sit at 0.1.1 in the tree, unuploaded. The other sixteen are built, hashed, cold-install
tested, and have gone nowhere. Nothing this program built reached a package index.

**The Hugging Face cards you will read were written in July and August.** The provenance and
negative-control blocks we wrote this program are local only, behind the unsigned publish gate.

**Every receipt path on our public pages points into a repository you cannot open.** 25 public files
cite them. We kept the citations because a sourced number you cannot open still says exactly what was
measured, and added a sentence to every README saying so.

**The company has no name.** The default is contested on three surfaces: the Hugging Face
organisation does not exist, the GitHub name is held by a User account created 2026-03-02 with zero
public repositories, and the .com belongs to a third party. Nothing in our content package binds a
name, an organisation or a domain.

**And the caveat that applies to every proof we publish:** a machine-checked proof is evidence that a
derivation is sound, not that the statement means anything. Our own theorem-transfer engine emits an
instance describing a domain that does not exist, and the Lean kernel accepts it clean. A sibling
lane reached the same conclusion from the other side with `theorem t : True := trivial`, which is
axiom-clean and proves nothing.

---

## Part 5 — Errors by the program that graded us

These belong in the estate's honesty record, not only in ours. We include the ones that touched this
lane, because a portfolio that publishes only its lanes' mistakes is still curating.

**A census answered from thirteen recalled names instead of an enumeration**, reported as "zero PyPI
publishes in this program" and "one package on PyPI". Both halves were wrong: nine estate packages
are on PyPI, eight predating the program and one published by it. That is I4 — *do the whole list,
never a sample* — violated by the instrument that grades lanes on I4. Another lane caught it. We
re-measured our own four against the index for this package rather than accepting either number.

**A concurrency fix declared done that was not.** Making each write atomic did not make a
read-modify-write atomic; seven lanes' state records were silently erased and four turns died after
running and being paid for. A lost update announces nothing. The control now reproduces it: 1 of 7
survive under the old pattern, 7 of 7 under the new.

**A ruling that could not validate.** We were told an artifact under a nonexistent organisation gets
`url: null`; the site schema types `url` as a string, so null fails validation. Another lane measured
both forms and omitted the key instead. We did the same and recorded the deviation rather than
making it silently.

**Assertions about our tree that our tree contradicted.** We were told a branch had never been
pushed; it was pushed on eight of nine lanes, ours included, and we read the remote ourselves and
said so. Elsewhere the program told a lane its publish guard was fixed when it was not, propagated a
"3 of 8" figure the artifacts record as 2 of 8, 1 of 9 and 0 of 7, and validated a stranger-verifier
claim from a developer's environment with the tools already on `PYTHONPATH`.

---

## What this file is not

It is not a list of everything wrong with this lane; it is the list of everything we found, and the
first-hour section exists because we went looking one more time and found seventeen failing tests we
had not mentioned.

Two review passes were run over this file before it was committed, because this estate's record says
one was never enough. **The first pass re-derived every number from its receipt and found nothing.
The second pass checked the claims the first had trusted, and found three defects in this very
file** — a count of 25 that is really 46, "four" diligence documents that are five, and a file
extension missing from a breakdown that then failed to sum. A document about overclaiming that
overclaimed its own thoroughness would have been the worst item in it. Having run two passes, we do
not claim two are enough either.


---

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# What this lane got wrong, what it would have claimed if nobody had stopped it, and what you will find in the first hour

Written 2026-09-04, at the end of the program. Everything below was found by this lane's own instruments,
by an orchestrator's check this lane then reproduced, or by measurements run today for this file, in a
fresh clone of the branch a reader would receive. Every item names its receipt. None of it is softened, and
none of it was found by a customer.

If anything on our public surfaces contradicts this file, this file is right.

---

## Part 1 — What we would have claimed if nobody had stopped us

**A 30.5% knee uplift on a real production trace.** That was our first headline. The replay bridge that
turned block ids into text mapped **13,712 distinct ids onto 33 distinct texts**, so nearly every request
shared a prefix with nearly every other. The tell was arithmetic available before the run: the engine
reported a hit rate of **0.3865** against a theoretical maximum for that stream of **0.1687**. A hit rate
above the cold-miss ceiling is not a strong result, it is a broken instrument. The bridge had a gate; the
gate checked that blocks sharing an id share their text, and not that blocks with distinct ids have
distinct text. Both directions are asserted now, before a replay serves anything
(`results/d1_engine_hit_rate.json`, `bench/trace_io.py`, `NEGATIVE_RESULTS.md` Part II·X).

**Then +7.9%, from a single replicate.** Rebuilt on the fixed bridge the effect measured 7.9% at n=1. We
would have published it. At **n=8** the paired median ratio is **0.949884**, ci95 **[0.906346, 1.065434]**,
**p = 0.62503** — and the run had been sized against the wrong variance: the plan sized n=8 on the collapsed
stream's `s_y` of **0.047**, while the fixed bridge's is **0.0967**, so it could resolve **11.83%** where
the bar was written for **5.58%**. The knee uplift is not a result at this size
(`results/s06_c1_fixed_bridge_n8.json`, `results/s46c_apc_fixed_bridge_n8.prereg.json`).

**That the two red certificates could be quietly repaired.** Two n=8 certificates carry an empty
`does_not_prove` because our own config derivation dropped the limits block. The proposed fix was to copy
the text into the certificates afterwards, with a field recording that it had been stamped. That was
refused. A certificate is a record of what a run knew when it ran. We fixed the six configs so every future
run carries its limits, added a test that fails when a sealed config has an empty block, and left the two
certificates red (`STALE_CLAIMS.md`, `tests/test_sealed_config_limits.py`).

**That a plan is a receipt.** Our push list said the lane branch had never been pushed. When the one
approved push ran, the branch was **already on the remote**, at a commit we had never pushed, and the
owner's branch had moved on the same remote in the same window. One push from a shared working tree would
explain both and we cannot see who ran it from inside the repository. "Nothing has left this repo" was true
of our actions and false of the remote, and only the remote decides
(`reaudit/s12b_push_line1.json`).

**Two counts, in the first hour the barrier between lanes opened.** We published that we held 138 non-raw
certificates and that one bound a Lean theorem by name. Re-measured before they were cited: **142**
certificates and **exactly four** naming a Lean declaration. The second number matters to another lane that
is being asked to make that field load-bearing (`CROSS_LANE_CITATIONS_2026-09.md`).

**Six more, inside the content package, caught by a gate we wrote to fail first.** Two indictments cited
config files that do not exist. The hero credited one certificate with two numbers that live in two. Three
Bailian figures were wrong in the third decimal against their own certificate — **15.183, 14.998, 12.254**
where the receipt says **15.182, 14.995, 12.25**. A statement asserted 58 certificates with absolute paths
and 24 with an unknown git revision; re-measured over **142** non-raw certificates today, **44** carry an
absolute filesystem path and **36** carry an unknown git revision, and since no file carries either pair the
package no longer states them. Those counts come from a command, not a file, so here it is — and the first
version of this sentence said 35 rather than 44, because the sentence was written from an earlier narrower
pattern than the command printed beneath it. The second self-check pass ran the command and caught it:
`python3 -c "import json,glob,re;C=[json.load(open(p)) for p in glob.glob('results/*.json') if 'raw' not in p];A=re.compile(r'\"/[A-Za-z]+/[A-Za-z]+/');print(len(C), sum(bool(A.search(json.dumps(d))) for d in C), sum(d.get('git_rev')=='unknown' for d in C))"` A negative-results row
counted rows the certificate does not count (`site-program/package.json`, `tools/check_site_package.py`).

## Part 2 — The instruments that were wrong, including one that was measuring us

**The stranger's verifier was refused twice, for two independently sufficient reasons.** Its parity bar
failed: **68 of 96** stored measurements recompute and **no committed certificate exercises one of its four
rules** (`results/s06_verifier_parity.json`). Separately, run the way a stranger would run it — as a file,
from the repository root, with nothing on the path — it **crashed on all five test inputs**, exit 1, no
verdict at all.

**The estate's own cross-lane instrument measured us in the wrong environment, and said so.** The
orchestrator's cross-verification matrix reported that our verifier returned exit 0 on every input. That is
true only with the repository on the path, which is how our own bench script imports it, so that is how it
was run. Run as a stranger would, it crashed instead. Same defect, two faces; the estate's instrument saw
one, we measured the other, and the correction was written into the matrix against its author's name. An
instrument that reproduces a developer's environment is measuring the developer
(`reaudit/s08_verifier_contract_before.log`).

**The page could never have loaded.** `verifier/index.html` fetched **four** files into the browser while
one of them imported a **fifth** that the page never fetched. The S06 parity certificate had called that
same bundle **3 of 3 byte-identical** to the repository modules and could not see it, because byte-identity
is not self-containment. Both are fixed and the verifier is still not shipped
(`results/s08_verifier_contract.json`, `oss/outbox/verifier/NOT_BUILT.md`).

**Three of four refusal rules have never refused anything.** All four are tripped by a forgery built from a
real certificate. But the seal check, the replicate floor and the cost identity are **never exercised in the
refusing direction by any committed certificate in this repository**. They are real, they are tested, and
they have never fired on our own data (`results/s08_parity_bar.json`).

**A certificate kept a number the prose had retracted.** An audit found the minimum-detectable-effect
formula anti-conservative and every figure in the documents was recomputed exactly. The three certificates
those figures came from were never re-stamped: **28 rows** still carry the retracted values. It went unseen
for six days because the check compared the re-derivation against the *document* and never against the
certificate's own field (`NEGATIVE_RESULTS.md` Part II·XI).

**An instrument reported OK on a stream with nothing to measure.** The fleet report was pointed at a control
whose block ids never repeat, where the correct answer is a cold-miss floor of 1.0 and no cache helps. The
instrument returned OK; the runner around it refused the file, which is how the control was caught
(`results/s06_bailian_fleet_audit.json`).

**A paid run that measured nothing, twice.** A scraper was added to a module and a GPU run was launched to
collect engine counters; it returned nulls because the code path meant to call the scraper never called it.
Exit 0, no data, **$0.86**. A later attempt read a Prometheus `_created` timestamp as a counter and produced
a hit rate of 1.0 with caching switched off. Both failed attempts are kept under their own names
(`NEGATIVE_RESULTS.md` Part II·IX, `results/d1_engine_hit_rate.attempt2_timestamp_as_counter.json`).

**The spend figure was wrong in four documents at once** — roughly $6.8, roughly $7, about $10.7, and in one
recollection about $85 — against a ledger floor recomputed from wall-clock and rate of **$11.4106**, whose
own rate table reads `pricing_verified: false` (`results/spend_ledger.json`).

**A sealed bar with a clause nobody ever ran.** `results/s06_verifier_parity.prereg.json` seals five
substantive clauses. The certificate evaluates four. The fifth, `browser_run` — "owner-run in a browser; the
page reports PASS/FAIL" — was never executed, and the certificate's verdict is silent about it rather than
recording it as unevaluated. Given what we later learned about the page, it could not have been satisfied.

**Machine-checked is not meaningful.** We elaborate our own Lean corollary and print the kernel's axiom
footprint. That proves the proof is a proof. It does not prove the statement describes anything real:
elsewhere in this estate a kernel-clean theorem describes a domain that does not exist
(`reaudit/lake_axioms_attained.log`).

## Part 3 — Filters we wrote that suppressed signal along with noise, measured

**The package's number gate does not look at the honesty section.** It visits the hero, theorems,
indictments, envelope, artifacts, opening result and negative results. It never visits `honesty.confession`
— which is this file, and holds more numeric tokens than any other section — nor the **5** in the verifier
section nor the **2** in the open questions. The part of the package fed verbatim to a website is the part
whose numbers no gate checks. They were checked by hand for this file, twice, which is weaker
(`tools/check_site_package.py`).

**It skips two classes of number by construction:** a four-digit year, and a bare zero. A wrong year or a
wrong zero passes silently. We do not print the counts here, because this file is embedded in the package it
describes and every count of it changes when the count is written into it — a document cannot be its own
fixed point. Compute them at any commit with
`python3 -c "import json,sys;sys.path.insert(0,'tools');import check_site_package as C;p=json.load(open('site-program/package.json'));print(sum(len(list(C.numbers_in(s))) for _,s in C.walk(p)))"`
and compare against the gate's own reported total.

**Its first binding rule was a tolerance band, and the band was the defect.** A number bound if any float in
a cited receipt fell within 2e-3 relative. The self-test caught a planted **0.0912** binding to a
certificate that never states it, because a certificate holds enough floats that something lands in any
band. Binding is now exact or by rounding to the decimals the sentence itself states. The first version
would have passed a wrong number and called it checked.

**Its path detector required a directory separator**, so it never saw `STALE_CLAIMS.md`, `README.md` or
`NEGATIVE_RESULTS.md`. Widened, receipt references went from **166** to **278**. Everything it found in the
gap was a real reference it had not been resolving.

**A generator fallback that hid a dangling receipt.** The envelope builder takes the first backticked path
in a row *that resolves on disk*, and falls back when none does. A row whose only receipt is a missing file
would therefore have been rendered with a silent substitution. One such row existed and was caught only
because the widened detector found the path in the row's prose instead. Of **58** rows in the stale-claims
ledger, **3** carry a backticked repository path that does not resolve: the one now corrected, a glob, and one
naming a file under a `scratchpad` directory that sits outside the repository entirely — **a receipt no
reader will ever have**.

**The I8 scan checks a fixed list of six markers.** Anything harmful that is not on the list is not
detected. It is public-by-default, which is the part that matters, but its vocabulary is ours.

**The register's own gate 2 examines 150 of 171 entries.** It reports PASS on the examined subset. Twenty-one
entries are waived with a written reason and are not examined by it (`reaudit_explained.json`).

## Part 4 — The numbers in the content package we are least sure of, and what would settle each

1. **The model's 0.038678 against the engine's 0.0385.** The engine value is measured at n=8 on the fixed
   bridge; the model value comes from the earlier n=1 run on the same trace and bridge, so the comparison
   crosses two runs. *Settled by:* recomputing the hash-only model from the n=8 run's own raw and comparing
   within a single run. It costs nothing and has not been done
   (`results/s06_c1_fixed_bridge_n8.json`, `results/s46b_engine_hit_rate.json`).
2. **The four Bailian headroom figures.** They are what an LRU model says about a provider's own hashes, and
   LRU stands in for a real engine's prefix tree. That stand-in is corroborated on one trace against one
   engine. *Settled by:* the provider running its own engine's counters against the same window. The traces
   carry no prompt text, so nobody outside that provider can do it
   (`results/s06_bailian_fleet_audit.json`).
3. **176,406,170,212 HBM token-seconds.** An unbounded pool, a one-hour hold, and wait classes inferred from
   the previous request's stop reason because the corpus carries no tool identities. *Settled by:* an
   operator replaying it against a real pool with a real eviction policy (`results/s06_weka_residency.json`).
4. **The 2.745% order-effect bound.** It is what thirty A/A replicates on one rig can exclude on one metric,
   not a property of the harness. *Settled by:* replication on a second GPU class (`results/order_effect.json`).
5. **The 1.6484 active-expert ceiling.** One model, and the decomposition beneath it is this machine's
   kernel timing. *Settled by:* the same decomposition on a second model family
   (`results/active_expert_ceiling.json`).
6. **The 12.0-point gate every Bailian file clears.** We chose 12.0. It is the S50 gate carried forward, not
   a threshold any operator gave us, so "all four clear the bar" means all four clear *our* bar
   (`results/s06_bailian_fleet_audit.prereg.json`).
7. **0.965737 reproducing a published 0.9657.** It reproduces the publisher's number under the publisher's
   definition. The corpus hashes are scoped per trace, so cross-session sharing is not measurable in it at
   all, and our agreement says nothing about that (`results/s06_weka_prefix_hit_rate.json`).

## Part 5 — What a buyer's engineer finds in the first hour that we did not mention

Measured today, in a fresh clone of the branch a reader would receive: **648 tracked files, 224 MB**
(`git clone --branch site-program/2026-09 --single-branch <repo> && git ls-files | wc -l && du -sh .`).
Every number in this part comes from a command run in that clone, and each command is named beside its
result, because a scratch log on our machine is not a receipt a reader can open.

**1. The first command in our README reports that the repository does not reproduce.** `make sprint53` is
the ten-minute reproduction the README leads with. Run in the fresh clone, it prints `9 of 9 headline artifacts
present`, then `tests PASS · audit FAIL · orphans 0`, then **`TIER 0 DOES NOT REPRODUCE`**, and exits 2. It
is behaving exactly as designed — it goes red when anything is red, and two certificates are red on purpose
— but a reader running our own headline command first sees a failure, and nothing in the README or the
content package warns them. That is the single thing we would most want back.

**2. The test suite does not give 615 on your machine.** README says 615 tests. With the estate fixture
absent, which is every machine but this one, `python3 -m pytest tests/ -q` gives **1 failed, 601 passed, 13
skipped in 524.13s**. On a machine that does have the estate mounted, reproduce it by making that one path
report absent: put `import pathlib; _r=pathlib.Path.exists; pathlib.Path.exists=lambda s: False if "untitled
folder 5" in str(s) else _r(s)` in a file on `PYTHONPATH` and run pytest with `-p` that module. Thirteen skip cleanly with `estate fixture not mounted`. The one failure is real:
`tests/test_trace_io.py::test_slice_provenance_cannot_be_mistaken_for_the_whole_capture` guards its first
half and then calls `load_any("mooncake_timed", ...)`, which needs the whole 12,031-request capture that
this repository does not ship — only the 600, 300 and 200-request slices are committed.

**3. Without scipy, our verifier accuses our own certificates.** The package tells a stranger to run
`python3 verifier/verify_core.py` on a sample certificate. With scipy present, `results/s01_aa_null_sharded.json`
comes back **VERIFIED, 12 checks, 0 failures**. With scipy absent, the same file comes back **FAILED, 8 of 12
MDE checks failing** — reproduce by blocking the import: run `verify_core.verify_path` in a process whose
`sys.meta_path` refuses `scipy` and `numpy`, or simply in an environment without them. The library is honest — it labels its fallback `mde_method: normal_approximation` and
returns **5.573** where the exact noncentral-t returns **5.589** — but the verifier never reads that label and
compares the approximation against a recorded exact value at a 1e-6 tolerance. A reader without scipy is told
eight of our stored measurements do not recompute, when what actually happened is that our verifier silently
used the very formula this estate retracted. It should refuse rather than grade when the exact path is
unavailable; that fix is one line and is not made.

**4. Our own S08 contract battery never caught number 3**, because it ran in an environment that has scipy.

**5. The browser page needs a web server and does not say so.** `verifier/index.html` loads its bundle with
`fetch()` on relative paths. Opened from a `file://` URL, which is what double-clicking gives you, browsers
refuse those requests, so the page stops at "loading" and the buttons never enable. It needs to be served
over HTTP, and nothing in the page or the repository says that. **No receipt of any browser run exists
anywhere in this repository**, and the sealed clause that required one was never evaluated. The pinned
pyodide build is at least live: the CDN returns HTTP 200
(`curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/pyodide/v0.27.7/full/pyodide.js`).

**6. A shared gate reports three of our register rows as unreceipted.** `check_status_vs_receipts` reads
`out/run_receipts.json`, which holds **85** receipts, and reports `0 contradiction(s), 3 unreceipted RAN
claim(s)` — the three S08 entries. Their receipts exist and record all three as REPRODUCED, in
`reaudit/gate4_s08.json`, which is not the file the shared gate reads. The gate is right that it cannot see
them. Merging them is not done.

**7. Nothing here is publicly reachable.** The one pushed target is a private backup whose unauthenticated
API returns 404. Every other artifact in the package reads `planned`, two of them carry an organisation name
in their own distribution name that nobody has settled, and the browser verifier is deliberately not shipped
at all (`reaudit/s12b_push_line1.json`).

## Part 6 — What is still red, on purpose

`make verify` ends `615 passed in 532.08s`, both README counts matching, and **2 FAILURES**, which the
audit prints by basename and which live at `results/s46c_apc_fixed_bridge_n8.json` and
`results/s47b_aa_fixed_bridge_n8.json`: `does_not_prove is present but EMPTY`.
Those two stay red. The parity bar reports **28** disagreements over **115** checks on **27** certificates
and does not gate them away. The verifier is not shipped. The knee uplift is not a result. We would rather
publish all of that than a page that reproduces on one machine.

